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afford to disregard his reputation, which would be injured by the libel suit.
Nor is the radio station without an interest in the matter despite legal
immunity. Its reputation would also be injured by an action brought against
the speaker, and it may thus be expected to continue to exercise some pre-
cautions as to material it broadcasts. Thus it might well be that the station
would continue to make use of its knowledge and experience, but as an ad-
viser rather than as an arbiter.
If within the framework of Section 315 as presently in force a choice must
be made between the two rules, the FCC's interpretation seems preferable.
A balance must be struck between the goals of free speech and freedom from
false and damaging utterances. In the medium of radio, and in the par-
ticular field of political broadcasts, the desirability of full and uncensored
discussion seems paramount.
WALTER A. GoDmHILf
STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATE PROCEDURE
FOR ELECTING DIRECTORS"
WHI7E ultimate control of a corporation theoretically rests in the owners
of the voting stock,' it has long been recognized that the intimate contact
of the directors with the corporate business. and the proxy voting system
may enable them to gain almost unrestricted control.2 Even the cumulative
t Member of the third-year class, Yale Lay; School.
* Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment Associates, Inc., 51 A2d 572 (Del.
1947).
1. Right to control has been held to be an "essential attribute of [stockholder's] prop-
erty," Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 194 N.Y. 212, 229, 7 N.E.
443, 449 (1909) ; an inherent power, Stoker v. Continental Trust Co. of City of New Yor,
186 N.Y. 235, 297, 78 N.E. 1090, 1094 (1906) ; an inherent right, Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216
Ala. 486, 491, 113 So. 516, 521 (1927). The preeminence of the shareholders is exemplified
by the common law proposition that if the directors or officers wvhose duty it is to call a
shareholder meeting fail or refuse to issue the call, a stockholder may bring mandamus to
force them to do so. E.g., State v. Wright, 10 Nev. 167 (1875) ; People v. Cummings, 72
N.Y. 433 (1878) ; see 3 Coox, A TRATIsE ox T E LAw OF Co ro*xAIoNs HA%-.G C%',PIT,%L
Siocx §§ 593, 603 (8th ed. 1923) ; 2 THonTisox, Coitm:En.uurMs O1 TIM LAw o2 C0rProXA-
TIONS § 1038 (3rd ed. 1927). But in 1932 only 22 of the 200 largest corporations in the
United States were actually controlled by majority owners, BER.n Aim Miu.-s, Ti.
MoDmNu CoRpoRATIOi AND Pmv.ATE PaoPrmrr- 94-6 (1932). See generally, Rhorlich, Stits
in Equity by Minorit , Stockholders as Means of Corporate Control, 81 U. o7 PA. L. R"¢v.
629, 727 (1933); Rhorlich, Corporate Voting: Majority Co;trol, 7 S. Jomzz's L. R-v.
218 (1933).
2. Such factors as widespread ownership, inertia and inaccessability of meeting place
have resulted in a decreased personal participation of the shareholder at shareholder meet-
ings. See BERLE AND MEANs, op. cit. supra note 1, passim; DzwriN, Tim Fn.A icAL
PoLIcy OF CooRA nI Ios 628 (1926).
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voting privilege, designed to secure effective representation for outsider
minorities, has been employed by the directors as a device for electing their
own candidates.8 Moreover, especially in the large corporations, the stock-
holders may be both ignorant and apathetic as to the management of the
business despite SEC requirements of notice in proxy statements.4 As a
consequence, it is usually difficult for an insurgent element to convince more
than a small percentage of stockholders to vote for a change in directors.
A factor directly affecting the comparative difficulty of electing new di-
rectors is necessarily the proportion of voting shares which the insurgent
group is required to muster., If the number is too low, minority groups by
surprise moves can elect their nominees so easily that no continuity of man-
agement can be assured. If the number is too great, the incumbent directors
can usually perpetuate themselves in office, since statutes in virtually all
states provide that directors hold office until their successors are elected
and qualified. 6 Faced with this problem,7 state legislatures have formulated
diverse requirements governing corporate elections.
3. Under a cumulative voting system a stockholder is given the right to cast votes
equal in number to the share vote-units he controls times the number of directors to be
elected. These votes he may distribute as he chooses among the candidates for the offices,
and the election is valid even though a majority of the directors elected receive the votes of
only a minority of the shares. Chicago Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Buggiano, 202 Ill. 312, 67
N.E. 17 (1903).
To avoid the possibility that the cumulative voting privilege will be exercised unex-
pectedly to capture an election, most states require that notice be given before it is exer-
cised. MINN. STAT. § 7492-25 (Mason's 1940 Supp. 1927), see Honshour, The Minnesota
Business Corporation Act, 17 MINN. L. REV. 689, 702 (1933). As to cumulative voting and
how it operates, see 5 FLErcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COr0RATIONS § 2048
(rev. and perm. ed. 1931), and BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 177 (rev. ed. 1946).
4. The average shareholder in the large corporation is primarily interested in financial
return; when apprehensive of the management's future course, he sells his stock. Rhorlich,
Corporate Voting: Majority Control, 7 ST. JoHn's L. Ray. 218 (1933). Federal statutes do
require the larger corporations to furnish a variety of information in the proxy statement
as to the purpose of the solicitation, e.g., § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1946) ; § 12(e) of the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 824 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 1 (e) (1,946) ; § 20 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20 (1946). But the proxy
statement is not enough in itself to prod the average shareholder into active participation in
corporate affairs. See Vinikoor, The Securities Exchange Commission and Proxy Regola.
tion, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 406 (1948) ; Manahan, Compliance with S.E.C. Proxy Rules, 20 So.
CAL. L. REr. 355 (1947).
5. Voting requirements are embodied in the state statutes and the corporation by-
laws. To determine the election requirements of a particular corporation, the two must be
read in conjunction. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ross v. Anderson, 31 Ind. App. 34, 42 (1903).
Of the federal acts, only the Investment Companies Act of 1940 specifies the proportion of
shares that must be represented at an election meeting or the votes that must be cast to
elect. 54 STAT. 813 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (1946) ; 54 STAT. 799 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a(4) (1946).
6. E.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 41, §29 (1935); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 610.02, 611.16,
612.33 (1943). Some courts have asserted that unless some such provision were made for
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Under the common law rule, followed in twelve states and the District of
Columbia,s directors may be elected by vote of a majority of the shares bal-
loted at a duly-called election meeting, no matter how small the number of
shares represented.' Under this rule it is relatively easy for an active
minority group to secure the election of its nominees by secretly gathering
its strength while an over-confident majority group rests in false security. 9
Perhaps for this reason, thirty-sx jurisdictions have modified the common
law rule by statute."
At the other extreme is the corporation code of South Dakota, which re-
quires that: "All elections of directors must be by ballot and a vote of stock-
holders representing a majority of the subscribed capital stock or a majority
of the members is necessary to a choice." 12 The statute, as yet uninter-
preted by the courts, might be construed to mean either that the winning
candidate must receive the votes of a majority of the outstanding voting
shares, or merely that a majority of the outstanding voting shares must be
cast for the election to be valid. Even by the latter construction the statute
imposes more than a mere majority quorum requirement in that the ma-
jority must not only be present, but must cast their votes. Thus a minority
might defeat a potentially valid election by refraining from voting, where
by voting negatively they could not prevent the election of the opposition
candidates.
continuance in office of the incumbent board, a dissolution would result should the stock-
holders fail to effect a valid election on the final day of the term. See, e.g., Walsh v. State
of Alabama ex reL. Cook, 199 Ala. 123, 125, 74 So. 45, 46 (1917). Others have held that
failure to elect does not alone result in a dissolution, but only makes the corporation sub-
ject to dissolution by appropriate judicial proceedings. Trustees of Vernon Sec'y v. Hills,
6 Cowen 23 (N.Y. 1826) ; Cahill and Smith v. The Kalamazoo Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Doug. 124
(Mich. 1845).
7. As to non-cumulative voting the problem is two-fold: how many shares must te
represented to form a quorum and what vote should be required to elect. Where shares are
voted cumulatively, the candidates receiving the greatest number of votes are elected, but
the problem remains as to what quorum should be specified.
8. Seven states follow this rule without statutory provision. Five states, however, have
codified it. E.g., Ann. STAT. § 64-403 (1947) ; NEv. LAWS § 1632 (1929). And see D.C.
CoDx § 29-205 (1946).
9. E.g., Attorney General v. Davy, 2 Atk. 212, 26 Eng. Rep. 531 (1741) ; discussed
in Note, 91 SoL. J. 170 (1947). This was the common law rule applicable to a body com-
posed of an indefinite number of individuals. To constitute a legal meeting of a definite-
sized body, on the other hand, a majority of the whole body must be present. See, e.g.,
Morrill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, 377, 55 NAV. 547, 549 (1893). For cases
applying the rule see Eagle Iron Co. v. Colyar, 156 Fed. 954 (5th Cir. 1907) ; Martin v.
Chute, 34 Minn. 135, 24 N.W. 353 (1885). See generally, MoAvrz, Pmv,xn Coreo.-
Tioxs § 354 (2d ed. 182) ; 3 Coo, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 607, 608.
10. See, e.g., Brown v. The Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 5 Blatch. 525, 4 Fed. Cas. 421
(1867) (description of extent to which minority group can take advantage of majority
stockholders under common law rule).
11. See notes 13-7 infra.
12. S.D. Coos §§ 11.0701, 11.0711 (1939).
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A position midway between the common law and South Dakota extremes
has been adopted by five states, the first of which was California."8 The
corporation codes of these states specify that an election is valid only when a
majority of the outstanding voting shares are represented, but that candidates
receiving the highest number of votes cast by this quorum shall be elected. 14
Such statutes make it more difficult than does the common law rule for a
minority group to secure the election of its nominees, yet do not expose the
corporation to as great a danger of self-perpetuation by directors as does
the South Dakota rule.
On the theory that quorum and vote requirements should vary according
to corporate needs, however, most states have rejected the specificity of
statutory requirements, preferring to grant varying degrees of discretion to
the corporation. Some limit corporate choice to a determination of the
quorum necessary to hold an election meeting.15 A large number, however,
grant discretion both as to quorum and vote requirements. Under all of
these statutes there is the possibility that a corporation will adopt unde-
sirable election rules, going either to the common law or South Dakota
extremes.
The immediacy of this possibility is evidenced by Standard .Power & Light
Corp. v. Investment Associates, Inc.,"7 in which a charter requirement similar
to the South Dakota statute was involved. In accordance with the statute
13. CA. CoD, CoRPs. § 2211 (Deering 1947).
14. The statutes of the five states vary as to the form of the provisions. The California
code specifies the size of the quorum; since it does not state the vote required to elect, the
common law majority-vote rule applies by implication. CAL. CODE, CoxM's. § 2211 (Deering
1947). The North Dakota code includes the same provision but makes an exception for
corporations with less than $10,000 capitalization, permitting them to establish their quorum
requirements in by-laws. N.D. Rsv. CODE §§ 10-0511, 10-0512 (1943). The Wyomng and
North Carolina statutes specify both the size of the quorum and vote necessary to elect.
Wyo. Comp. STAT. § 44-114 (1945) ; N.C. CODE § 55.112 (1939).
15. These statutes vary greatly in the degree of discretion given to the corporations to
determine the size of the quorum. E.g., MONT. REv. Con § 5931 (1935) (quorum as by-
laws specify) ; N.M. STAT. §§ 54-403, 54-404 (1941) (quorum as by-laws specify, but not to
exceed a majority of voting shares) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 156, §§ 13, 28 (1932) (quorum of
majority of voting shares unless by-laws specify otherwise) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.10-9,
14.10-13 (1939) (quorum of majority of voting shares unless by-laws specify a lesser num-
ber) ; IL. ANN. STAT. C. 32, § 157.31 (1941) (quorum of majority of voting shares unless
by-laws specify otherwise, but in no case less than one-third).
Under all of these statutes, the vote necessary for election is a majority of those pres-
ent; either by specific provision or by tacit incorporation of the common law rule.
16. E.g., N.H. Rav. LAws c. 274, § 4 (1942), and ME. REV. STAT. c. 49, § 22 (1942)
(complete discretion as to vote and quorum) ; MixN. STAT. §§7492-4, 7492-27 (Mason's
1940 Supp. 1927), and MIcu. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.13, 21.38 (1935) (quorum of majority of
voting shares unless by-laws specify otherwise; vote to elect determined in by-laws);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 18-2-42 (1943), and MD. ANN. Cos art. 23, § 20 (1939) (quorum of
majority of voting shares unless by-laws specify otherwise; majority of votes cast elects
unless by-laws specify otherwise).
17. 51 A.2d 572 (Del. 1947).
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of Delaware permitting the individual corporation to determine the vote
required to elect its directors,"9 Standard Power and Light Corporation had
adopted articles of incorporation which declared: "The holders of the Com-
mon Stock Series B shall have the right by vote of a majority in number of
shares of the Common Stock Series B issued and outstanding to elect a
minority in number of the full Board of Directors of the Corporation." 19 At
a duly-called meeting for election of Class B directors where a majority of the
voting shares were represented, nominees of a group of stockholders oppos-
ing the incumbent directors received the vote of a majority of the ballots
cast but not of all outstanding voting shares.' Following a dispute as to
the validity of the election, their stockholder supporters brought suit 21 to
determine whether these candidates should assume office or whether the
incumbent directors should retain their positions until an election wherein
some nominees received the vote of a majority of the outstanding voting
stock.22
Concluding that the phrase "vote of a majority in number of shares . . .
issued and outstanding" was ambiguous, the court interpreted the articles
as permitting election where a majority of the outstanding shares are bal-
loted at the meeting though a majority of the outstanding shares are not
voted for any one candidate. This interpretation was adopted by the court
as more consonant with "well established principles of fairness and reason-
ableness." 23 Aware that many shareholders normally fail to cast their
18. DnL.REv.CoDn§§2037,s.s.11,§2049 (1935).
19. Article Fourth, quoted in Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment Associates,
Inc., 51 A.2d 572, 574 (Del. 1947). This article also provided that Class A directors (who
comprised a majority of the board) should be elected by Class A shareholders under the
same procedure, though apparently no difficulty had arisen as to their election. The pro-
vision is unusual and is not in accordance with the Delaware standard form. See 1
FLETcHER, CO0RA-E FoRMs AND PrEcEDET,-rs ANNo, ar §§ 215, 1210 (3rd and rev. eJ.
1938).
20. At the time of the 1946 election, there were 110,000 shares of common stack Series
B outstanding. Of these shares the opposition nominees gained 42,519 votes as against
40,828 votes for the nominees of the management. Standard Power & Light Corp. v. In-
vestment Associates, Inc., 51 A.2d 572, 574 (Del. 1947).
21. In the absence of statute a court of equity has no power to take jurisdiction for the
purpose of determining the legality of shareholder elections. Fleer v. Frank Fleer Corp.,
14 Del. Ch. 277, 125 At. 411 (1924). The statutes of Delaware, however, confer this power
on the court of chancery. DEL. Rnv. CODz § 2063 (1935).
22. The incumbent directors had been elected originally in 1944 at the annual stoch-
holders' meeting. At the 1945 meeting, management was unable to secure the presence of a
quorum of the outstanding Series B stock. Because of the inability of those present to
elect directors, the meeting was adjourned from time to time, and finally adjourned Axne die.
Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment Associates, Inc., 51 A.2d 572, 577 (Del.
1947).
23. The lower court reasoned that if this interpretation were adopted, an election
would almost always result. Investment Associates, Inc. v. Standard Power & Light Corp.,
48 A.2d 501, 507 (Del. Ch. 1946). Once there is a quorum, a minority cannot prevent a
valid election by withdrawal. He-xter v. Columbia Baldng Co., 16 Del. Ch. 248, 145 At.
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ballots,14 the court argued that to require a majority of all outstanding stock
for election would unduly favor incumbent directors." Though the court
thus allowed the election of new directors in this instance, the interpretation
which it adopted also may permit invalidation of future elections, as under
the South Dakota statute, by strategic withdrawals of the minority opposi-
tion reducing the number of votes cast below a majority of all outstanding
shares.
Apparently anticipating that corporations might adopt election procedures
which would make election of insurgent candidates difficult, the Delaware
legislature has provided safeguards in its corporation code against a manage-
ment's attempted self-perpetuation in office. Thus there are provisions re-
quiring annual elections and limiting directors' terms of office to a maximum
of three years." Directors are to retain office under this section until their
successors are elected and qualified which may be indefinitely in the absence
of a valid election,27 but such an eventuality is unlikely in view of the stat-
utory provision for special elections.2 s The corporation code empowers the
chancellor to hold meetings on the application of the holder of even one
share of voting stock when directors fail to call an election or when an elec-
tion is held but no candidate receives the prescribed number of votes. At
this second meeting, election of directors is assured, since the statute per-
mits disregard of charter requirements and specifies that those present shall
constitute a quorum.29
115 (1929); Commonwealth ex rel. Sheip v. Vandergrift, 232 Pa. St. 53, 81 Atl. 153
(1911). See generally, 5 FLETCHER, op. cit. su pra note 3, § 2020. The lower court evidently
did not consider the effect of a failure of a minority opposition to vote.
The language of Chancellor Wolcott in Duffey v. Loft, Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 140, 148, 151
Atl. 223, 227 (1930), quoted by the court in the instant case, almost amounts to an admis-
sion that the court had strained the wording of the articles to arrive at its decision: "The
duty to hold such [an annual] meeting and to elect directors thereat is one that is laid by
the statute. So important is the direction that this duty be performed that in some instances
courts have brushed aside all strictness and technicality of view in the interest of securing a
statutorily commanded election, or, if one has been held, of sustaining its results....
[EW]here an extensive campaign has been carried on by rival groups for the votes of stock-
holders and arguments pro and con have been made, the parties interested should submit to
a count and let the majority prevail." 51 A.2d 572, 577 (Del. 1947).
24. In the lower court opinion, the chancellor declared that he took judicial notice of
the fact that under the most favorable circumstances many shareholders would not take the
trouble to vote. 48 A.2d 501, 507 (Del. Ch. 1946). The Supreme Court opinion, however,
did not explicitly discuss this possibility.
25. See note 6 supra and DEL. Rav. CODE §§ 2041, 2062 (1935).
26. DEL. REv. CODE § 2041 (1935). The section provides that the corporation may in
its articles of incorporation divide the board of directors into one, two, or three classes,
each class to serve terms equal in length, and at least one class to be elected annually,
27. See note 10 supra.
28. DEL. REV. CoDE § 2063 (1935).
29. It might be argued that by-lawv vote requirements must be respected at special elec-
tions, since the statute is silent as to them though it specifically permits disregard of by-law
quorum provisions. It seems highly improbable that the legislature had this intent, how-
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Since the possibility of self-perpetuation by directors may arise in all
states which have granted discretion to corporations in determining the
manner of electing directors, the codes of these states all include some safe-
guard similar to the Delaware provision for a special election. Some of these
provide flatly that where directors are not successfully elected at the meet-
ing called for in the by-laws a subsequent meeting shall be held, at which
those in attendance will constitute a quorum and nominees receiving a
simple majority of the votes cast will be elected.-" Other statutes allow
shareholders possessing a stated minimum percentage of the voting stock to
call a second meeting at which a majority of the shares voted is sufficient to
elect directors.31
This type of safeguard does not appear altogether satisfactory. 32 Special
election procedures may not be effective, for under some statutes it may be
difficult to secure representation of the percentage of stock necessary to call
an election, and added delay may result if nullified on a technicality of im-
proper call 13 or notice.S4 And if they are effective, they place a stringent
limitation on the grant of discretion, in that the vote and quorum require-
ments desired by the corporation are by-passed when not satisfied by the
first election.
As a further safeguard, some legislatures specifically withhold from di-
ever, for under that scheme there might be sufficient shares represented to hold an election
meeting, yet insufficient shares to carry out the single purpose for which the members as-
sembled.
30. E.g., IDA. CODE §29-135 (1932); LA. GL'r. STAT. § 1111 (1939); discussed in Ben-
nett, Louisiana Corporation Act, 2 LA. L. REv. 597, 628 (1940).
31. E.g., DEL. REV. CODE § 2063 (1935) ; Nan. REV. STAT. § 21-170 (1943) ; Ir re Jack-
son, 9 Del. Ch. 279, 81 AtI. 992 (1911); Bridges v. Staton, 150 N.C. 216, 63 S. E. S92
(1909) ; see Note, 2 A.L.R. 558 (1919).
32. Especially unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of securing elections are the statutes
which provide no less stringent vote and quorum requirements for special elections than
those provided for regular elections. MiNiT. STAT. 7492-24 Mason's 1940 Supp. 19-7; N.J.
AtNx. STAT. § 14: 10-2 (1939).
33. It is usually essential to the validity of acts done at a special meeting that the call
be made by the person or persons designated by the governing statute or by-law. State v.
Pettineli, 10 Nev. 141 (1875) (where by-laws commanded call by trustees, meeting called
by president held invalid); Reilly v. Ogleby, 25 W.Va. 36 (1S4) (where statute demanded
call by stockholders, call by the secretary on authority of the stockholders was insufficient) ;
Grant v. Elder, 64 Colo. 104, 170 Pac. 193 (1917) (where statute provided for call by two
directors, an election held on call of president vas invalid). See generally, 3 Cco, op. cit.
supra note 1, c. XXXVI.
34. An attempted election at a special shareholders' meeting will be invalid if the
notice does not specify that the meeting is to elect directors. Mere notice that the purpose
is to transact such business as may come before the meeting is insufficient. See Note, 51
A.L.R. 941, 957 (1927). Stockholders who attend but do not vote are held not to have
waived their right to object to the improper notice though they do v-aive their right by
voting, Dolbear v. Wilkinson, 172 Cal. 366, 156 Pac. 48S (1916). Nor does it matter that
the result would have been the same had notice been proper. Re Keller, 116 App. Div. S8,
101 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1906).
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rectors the right to modify voting requirements established by the charter
or the by-laws. 35 Even in the absence of such statutory provisions, courts
hold that legislation giving corporations the "power to make by-laws not
inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation" does not authorize
directors to pass by-laws affecting their classification or term of office." And
where legislatures have vested the power to enact by-laws in the share-
holders, with permission to the shareholders to delegate that power to li-
rectors,3 7 courts have similarly held that the delegation cannot include a
power in the directors to pass by-laws affecting their own qualification,
manner of election, or term of office." But while this rule obviates the
possibility of one method of self-perpetuation, it does not solve the generic
problem.
Thus the secondary controls adopted to restrict the broad discretion
granted by many states do not provide an adequate substitute for specificity
in the statute itself. A more effective means of insuring fair elections ap-
pears to be enactment of specific regulatory statutes like that adopted by
California. Continuity of management can thus be protected against sur-
prise election maneuvers by small minorities, and yet opposition to an un-
popular board of directors need not hurdle the often insuperable obstacle of
mustering a clear majority of all outstanding shares.
35. E.g., MIcE. STAT. ANN. §21.16 (1935); WASH. Rv. STAT. §3803-26 (1931);
MIrN. STAT. § 7492-23 (1927). On the other hand the Louisiana Code specifically confers
the power on directors, though the by-laws may be repealed by the shareholders. LA. G=it.
STAT. § 1109 (1939), discussed in Bennett, Louisiana Corporation Act, 2 LA. L. REv. 597,
627 (1940).
36. E.g., UTAH CoDa ANN. tit. 18, §2, s.s. 16 (1943); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32 § 157.25;
see Stevens v. Davidson, 59 Va. 819 (1868) ; 8 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note 3, § 4178. But
see Ayer, The New Washington Business Corporation Act, 8 WAsH. U. L. REv. 147, 154
(1934) stating that the Washington statute containing such provision was amended because
under it the directors might have been able to alter by-laws affecting their office. WASH.
REv. STAT. § 389 (1931).
37. The statutes vary considerably in detail. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 3031 (1943) and
Tnx. ANN. STAT. § 1326 (1933) (directors granted power to amend by-laws subject to
shareholders right to amend) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 25.206 (1933) (power in directors unless
charter vests it in shareholders) ; VA. CODE § 3787 (1942) and S.D. CODE: § 11.0603 (1939)
(power in shareholders who may confer it on directors subject to a power of repeal re-
served to themselves).
38. See, e.g., Curtis v. McCullogh, 3 Nev. 202 (1867) ; under these statutes directors
may postpone the holding of scheduled elections for a short period. Baker v. National Life
Ass'n, 183 Ia. 966, 166 N.W. 596 (1918). However, they cannot so change the holding of
elections as to have the effect of continuing themselves in office against the will of the share-
holders. Walsh v. Alabama ex rel. Cook, 199 Ala. 123, 74 So. 45 (1917) ; State ex rel.
Carpenter v. Kreutzer, 100 Ohio St. 246, 126 N.E. 54 (1919). On the power of directors to
pass by-laws generally, see 2 THomrsoN, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 1059, 1069-71.
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